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”
he investigation of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) is a recently popularized issue within the 
realm of international science and technology research. It has been a mere 18 years since the United States’ FDA 
declared that genetically engineered foods are not inherently dangerous and do not require special regulation. In 
the midst of the publicized controversy surrounding the idea of genetically engineered food items, Brazil has been 
caught between two differing forces in the agricultural realm: commercial farmers, researchers, and agribusiness 
vs. environmentalists and consumer advocates.  The history of GMO production in Brazil encompasses heated 
battles due to both internal and external disagreements. In addition to a general concern about the risks of 
growing and consuming bioengineered agriculture, the Brazilian government has struggled to integrate GMOs 
into the farming sector because Brazil’s largest agricultural importer, the European Union, has remained hostile to 
GMOs, placing strict rules on the importation, labeling, and distribution of these foods within their markets. 
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I. INTRODucTION
Because of this controversy, I have chosen to examine the 
implications of Brazil’s decisions regarding GMO production 
and trade within the past twelve years, focusing on the Brazil-EU 
trade partnership and the effects of GMO suppression on the 
Brazilian agricultural community. In order to closely look at the 
changes that have occurred, I will focus on the soybean sector for 
two reasons: Brazil is the second largest producer of soybeans in 
the world and their first controversial GM legislation, proposed 
in 1998, concerns the use of Monsanto’s Roundup Ready (RR®) 
Soybeans. Upon the introduction of this first piece of legislation, 
Brazil was hesitant to integrate biotechnology into its commercial 
farms, pressed by the European Union to remain GM-free because 
a large majority of European consumers were anti-GM, fearful of 
the unknown effects of bioengineering. But, as the GM conflict 
has persisted in Brazil, their federal government has repeatedly 
supported the dissemination of biotech crops and subsequent 
research and development in the field, while the EU continues to 
resist GM foods. So, why did Brazil make the change? 
I will discuss the interactions between Brazil and the EU during 
Brazil’s tense period of GM controversy, noting the nature of 
their relationship as trading partners and how trade patterns have 
changed since Brazil has stepped into the international GMO 
market between the years of 1998-2008. I suggest that Brazil’s 
executive body and agricultural sector has been unable to resist 
the influence of large corporations, such as Monsanto, therefore 
they have seen an enormous increase in the percentage of GM soy 
crops produced and exported. But, rather than harming Brazil’s 
economy, this has increased the EU’s participation in trade with 
Brazilian soy growers. Since Brazilian regulations on GM crops 
are still in the process of being solidified, Brazil has the largest 
percentage of non-GMO soybean acreage in the world, with 
almost 30% of their soybean production classified as conventional. 
The EU has not shifted its trading focus away from Brazil, instead 
it has become even more interested in utilizing both the GM 
(on a limited scale) and the non-GM soy crops available, further 
distancing its market from the worlds’ other important soy 
producers, including the United States and Argentina, who both 
have over 90% of their soy crop as GM. 
II. THE DEvELOpMENT OF THE gMO 
cONTROvERSy IN BRAzIL
In September 1998, Brazil’s National Biosafety Technical 
Commission (CTNBio) announced the Commercial Release of 
the Genetically Modified Soybean (Roundup Ready® Soybean), 
concluding that “there is no evidence of environmental risk or 
to the human or animal health from the use of the genetically 
modified soybean in question.”  This was the first attempt at 
GMO acceptance in Brazil, coming only two years after the 
manufacturer, Monsanto, introduced this herbicide tolerant 
bean on the international market. The resolution would allow 
Brazilian soybean farmers to purchase transgenic seeds from 
Monsanto as a five-year study was conducted to validate the new 
crops as harmless. Just weeks after this approval, backlash arose 
in the form a class-action lawsuit filed by environmentalists and 
consumer nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) within the 
6th Civil Law Circuit of Brasilia. They claimed that CTNBio 
“didn’t know enough about the safety of genetically modified 
crops when it cleared Monsanto.”  As a result, the lower court 
granted a preliminary order rescinding Monsanto’s permission to 
distribute the RR® seeds. After this decision, Monsanto and the 
federal government appealed to the regional federal court. 
The judges of this higher court denied the appeal in 2000, 
overruling CTNBio’s decree, immediately placing an outright 
ban on GMOs in the region indefinitely, requiring that an 
environmental impact study (EIS) be conducted and labeling 
requirements be established before any other GMOs were taken 
into consideration.  Quoted in the Wall Street Journal, Marilena 
Lazzarini, the executive coordinator of the Brazilian Institute for 
Consumer Defense (IDEC), one of the organizations that filed 
the suit against Monsanto, praised the court’s decision: “We hope 
that now they [Monsanto] will stop their irresponsible goal of 
liberating bioengineered seeds in the country without the necessary 
evaluation of risks to the environment and human beings.”  In 
addition to IDEC’s opposition to GMOs, the international 
conservationist organization Greenpeace vehemently opposed 
Brazil’s new decree on soy planting. Mariana Paoli, the Campaign 
Coordinator of Greenpeace’s Genetic Engineering Brazil depart-
53
ment stated: “We do not yet know the consequences of genetically 
modified organisms into the environment and public health. 
Therefore, we consider the application of the precautionary 
principle and the implementation of an EIS.”  Under the 
precautionary principle, the burden of proof that GMOs are NOT 
harmful falls on those who are supporting their use. So, therefore, 
in order for the genetically-modified foods to be considered 
acceptable, it would be the responsibility of an informed, ruling 
body to determine any risks and make that information available 
to the public. 
After the GMO ban in 2000, some planters were stuck with 
Roundup Ready® seeds that they had already acquired from 
Monsanto, and some were anxious to use the product, so they 
began to smuggle the seeds from Argentina, who at the time 
was the world’s second largest GMO producer. Argentina began 
using RR® seeds in 1996, and by 2003 almost 100% of their soy 
farms produced GM crops.  The majority of these illegal crops 
were brought from Argentina into Brazil’s state of Rio Grande do 
Sul, located right across the border in the southernmost part of 
the country. The federal government under President Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso did not support the court’s ban on GM crops 
and, therefore, has been accused of “indirectly encouraging the 
growing of GM soya, [because] it lacked a clear policy on GM 
crops and failed to adequately monitor crops.”  Although Cardoso 
did not take a strong stance against Monsanto’s seed, the state 
government took preventative measures, passing laws explicitly 
banning the cultivation of GMOs. They also tried to take 
advantage of the European Union’s concern about GM foods, 
urging farmers to stick with the non-GM crops and protest the 
relentless push toward GMOs from companies like Monsanto. 
One pamphlet they published even said that science should be 
“under public control to benefit life, not under private control to 
[benefit] profit.”  
In the end, the state government was unable to implement these 
preventative measures, and it is estimated that around six million 
tons of transgenic soybeans (80% of the region total) were ready 
to be harvested after the 2003 season.  This vast act of piracy 
had not gone unnoticed on the international soybean market; 
corporations and farmers across the globe who were legally 
growing the RR® soybeans spoke out against the ineffectiveness of 
Brazil’s government to curb the theft of Monsanto’s intellectual 
property. So, in March 2003, the federal government under newly 
elected President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, issued Provisional 
Measure (PM) 113, allowing the commercial use of the illegal 
crops that had already been grown using pirated seed. Following 
the publication of this measure in the United States, producers’ 
concerns continued to escalate: Brazil’s illegal exportation of GM 
soybeans gave them a distinct competitive advantage over the U.S., 
who had to pay both high taxes on their goods and royalties to the 
corporation.  This emergency measure did not permit Monsanto 
to bring more RR® seeds in, but in an effort to save the Rio Grande 
do Sul farmers from losing millions of dollars of crop that would 
otherwise be destroyed, the Brazilian government deemed this a 
“conduct adjustment,” only if the farmers would agree to not plant 
GMOs again. Monsanto tried to fight back against the Intellectual 
Property Rights violation by “requiring exporters in Brazil to sign 
license agreements” in order to export the RR® Soy that had been 
temporarily allowed in 2003 by issue of Presidential Decree, but 
since the crops were allegedly being placed back on the “ban list” 
the following year, such agreements were ignored and the illegal 
crops were distributed at the government’s command.  
At this point, PM 113 had set place very few, weak requirements 
such as the labeling of products in which GMOs consisted of 1% 
or more of the total volume. The labeling constraints were never 
adopted, and the Ministry of Agriculture even admitted that there 
“were not enough accredited laboratories available to certify GM 
and non-GM soybeans.  President Lula, who passed this measure 
in 2003, was eager to make some changes regarding biotechnology, 
feeling pressure from GM corporations such as Monsanto, who 
were ready to see compensation for the harvesting of their RR® 
product. In an attempt to make sure the federal courts could not 
issue another moratorium on GMOs by disregarding all other 
entities who should be consulted on such an assessment, a new 
Brazilian Biosafety Law (No 11,105) was passed in March 2005. 
This law created the National Biosafety Council (CNBS), and re-
established CTNBio as a group of 27 members from all facets of 
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agriculture, from a consumer rights specialist to a representative 
from the Ministry of Defense.  Also, it provided safety norms and 
inspection mechanisms that all sectors of GM production and 
trade would be required to follow, including parameters within 
the construction, storage, research, and marketing sectors. 
The most stirring portion of this law is that the responsibility of 
determining the safety GM products was completely handed to the 
newly formed CNBS. With this law in place, CTNBio was now 
allowed to provide the final word regarding the accepted technical 
opinion of GMOs. They were now in the position to implement 
much needed policies: monitoring research, authorizing new 
species of GM plants, and regulating the registration and farming 
of accepted crops. In Brazil, in order for a law to enter into effect, 
a regulatory decree must also be signed by the President, much 
like an Executive Order in the U.S. This decree cannot change the 
verbiage or provisions of the law, but it can create bureaucratic 
obstacles that could change the overall effectiveness of the law. 
Knowing that the Decree was needed, IDEC struck again, and 
the Federal Public Prosecutor filed a lawsuit in Brazil’s Supreme 
Court called a Direct Action of Unconstitutionality (AIDN), 
claiming that the law was unconstitutional and, therefore, could 
be challenged in the highest court of law. 
After eight months of rigorous debate among governmental 
officials, President Lula signed Decree No 5,591, implementing 
the provisions of Law No 11,105 and allowing CTNBio to finally 
get on track, regulating the GM trade in Brazil and expanding the 
use of GM crops throughout the nation. The law required that 
two-thirds vote was necessary within the CNBS to approve a 
new biotech agricultural product. Since the anti-GMO presence 
in Brazil was so fanatical and (even) militant, they were able to 
gain membership within CTNBio and block the passage of new 
GM regulations, inciting many scientists to ultimately leave the 
commission as no progress had been made and there were 500 
pending new product requests. So, in 2007, President Lula signed 
Law No 11,460, changing the previous law, calling for a majority 
vote within the CNBS, rather than a two-thirds vote. 
III. HOw HAS THE EuROpEAN uNION 
AgRIcuLTuRAL SEcTOR DEvELOpED wITHIN 
THE cONTExT OF THIS gMO MOvEMENT?
In 1999, multiple countries in the EU started urging the European 
Commission (EC) to place a de facto moratorium on any new 
GMO approvals and in July 2000, EU ministers accepted the 
proposal, agreeing that no new GMOs would be accepted into the 
European market until further labeling and tracing methods were 
researched, tested, and implemented. Europeans have exhibited a 
growing concern about food health and safety since the late 1990s, 
prompted by the disturbing emergence of mad cow disease and 
instances of AIDS-contaminated HIV blood. Today, the EU still 
has very hard guidelines for GM crops, allowing very few GM foods 
into the country and almost no cultivation within the borders. 
The EU’s opposition to the GM revolution has been intensified in 
recent years due to the steady growth of the anti-GMO movement 
across the continent, supported by the EC’s regulatory approach 
and embedded in a general sense of apprehension. Europeans were 
susceptible to far-fetched information about GM effects, hearing 
stories about dangerous additives, unhealthy processing methods, 
and the risk of cross-contamination between GM crops and 
GM-free crops, because it was very difficult to contain the two 
varieties in their designated areas once seeds were cross-pollinated 
and multiple harvests had been conducted. In order to gain access 
to the EU soybean market, Monsanto was granted a reportedly 
vague patent two years before the GM controversy began in 
Brazil: 1996. This patent encompasses genetically modified 
plants that have been made resistant to glyphosate, Monsanto’s 
own herbicide, also known as Roundup®. In agreement with the 
patent, the EC allowed Monsanto to introduce RR® soy into the 
EU market, but it was not (and to this day, is not) allowed to be 
cultivated on EU land.
The EC stresses the need to prevent “contamination” within the 
natural crop harvest, issuing a Commission Recommendation 
in July 2003 that outlines specific procedures to “ensure the co-
existence of genetically modified crops with conventional and 
organic farming.”  Although the first point of this document states 
that no form of agriculture will be excluded from the EU, the reality 
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is that the guidelines that have been put in place in order for GM 
growers to gain access into the European market are so stringent 
that even the most experienced and preeminent corporations 
cannot break-through in a reasonable amount of time. As Brazil’s 
government grapples with the idea of GMOs, some farmers have 
expressed their interest in remaining GM-free, seeing this as a 
way to remain competitive in the EU market is to produce the 
soybeans that they want to buy. Farmers believe that the price for 
natural soy will increase as the availability on the international 
market is contained primarily in Brazil, since it is the last major 
non-GE soy exporter in the world.  As of 2006, the Federation 
of Rural Workers and Family Farmers in South Brazil (FETRAF-
Sul/CUT) committed to selling more than 50,000 metric tons of 
GM-free soybeans to the European market with the help of the 
Dutch Soy Coalition.  A report published by the EC’s Directorate 
General for Agriculture and Rural Development published a study 
in 2007 urging the world’s major soybean producers to consider 
the EU’s harsh regulations and realize that even if the European 
Food and Safety Agency (the EU-wide regulatory agency for GM-
related issues) gives clearance to a certain food or feed, that does 
not mean that all Member States have accepted the GMO, as well. 
In fact, there has never been a majority agreement among Member 
Nations concerning any GM product.  
There have been many studies conducted investigating the EU’s 
weariness of biotech foods, and many scholars have suggested 
that negative consumer perception lies in a widespread lack 
of knowledge about the effects of GM crops, causing fear and 
rejection that will continue to grow as long as the anti-GM 
movement advertises exaggerated defects in GM cultures and 
the EC implements different submission hurdles and labeling 
policies to which biotech companies must conform. In her paper, 
“Governing GMOs in the EU: A Deviant Case of Environmental 
Policy-Making?,” G. Kristin Rosendal suggests the apparent lack 
of support is due to the ineffectiveness of “environmental policy 
in the face of influential corporate interests.”  She presents four 
theses to explain the EU’s resistance to the biotech industry: 
a lack of internal unity, limited access to decision making, the 
strength of counterbalancing forces, and industry interests for 
protectionist reasons. The GM backlash, she says, has been fueled 
by counterbalancing forces within the internal sector, including 
the work of Environmental NGOs (ENGOs) such as Greenpeace/
Friends of the Earth. An interesting element of the public opinion, 
she claims, is that “people [put] more trust in information from 
ENGOs compared to industry as well as regulatory authorities.” 
Her conclusion looks to the future of GM policy in the EU, 
deeming the effect of external activities (such as WTO disputes) 
as a “dark horse” that will increase opposition to GM foods in the 
beginning, but in the long run these events will help strengthen 
the GM movement in countries surrounding and interacting with 
the EU, hopefully obstructing their harsh policies and facilitating 
a change in the EC’s standards.  
Another scholar, Sylvie Bonny, also discusses the influence of 
NGOs on the anti-GM movement, but rather than focusing on 
their work within the policy sector, she focuses on their ability to 
exploit the fear that many Europeans already possess concerning 
biotech foods by creating media hype and promoting non-GM 
products in all sectors. In her paper, “Why are most Europeans 
opposed to GMOs?”, Bonny conducts a case study, comparing 
the anti-GM movement in France to that in the EU as a whole. 
She focuses on the development of this overwhelmingly negative 
response, linking the GM conflict to a strong distrust of firms and 
public authorities as food safety issues were widely publicized 
and the problems of industrial pollution came to the forefront 
around the same time that GM products were gaining ground in 
the international market.  She also attributes the negativity to the 
strong influence of NGOs and other associations that focus only 
on the risks, representing a segment of the population that began 
as a small circle of environmentalists, but has evolved into an 
enormous movement including economic interest groups, human 
rights activists, and agribusiness firms. By incorporating many 
different media outlets into their publicity schemes, Bonny claims 
that this dynamic sector of the public has been able to provide 
inescapable sources of suspicious information to the public, 
criticizing the GM movement on all levels and encouraging public 
support.  
In contrast to focusing on the transformation of public opinion with 
regards to policy support or media exploitation, Joyce Tait “analyzes 
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the risk-related problems that have arisen over the introduction of 
GM crops and food products in the context of the adoption of the 
Precautionary Principle (PP)” in her paper titled “More Faust than 
Frankenstein.”  This standard, established as a guideline at the 1992 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED) through the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, states that in order to protect the environment, 
each nation needs to interpret the safety of new technologies 
according to their ability, without disregarding potential damages 
due to a lack of certainty or scientific evidence. Ironically, in the 
EU’s circumstance, a precautionary stance was originally taken 
as an attempt to draw support from the public, avoiding the 
problems that arose while under a preventive regulatory system. 
Tait proposes the idea that the PP should have helped to “smooth 
the path” for new products, acting as a mechanism for confidence 
as the community could rest assured that through this method, 
GM foods would go through a stringent admissions process with 
“effective oversight of the industry’s activities.”  She describes the 
“overall trait trajectory,” attributing the seamless rise of the anti-
GM movement to a “perfect timing” sort of event, involving three 
important actors in the GM market; just as agri-business began 
arguing against regulation of the industry (in an attempt to gain 
further access into the market), GM promotional advertisements 
were attracting public attention and environmental NGOs (and 
others) were realizing the influence they had on public opinion 
due to the recent effects of the BSE Crisis (Mad Cow Disease). 
As Tait suggests, the Precautionary Principle was an important 
measure effecting the public impression of GM foods in the 
EU and the grade of confidence consumers had concerning the 
safety/reliability of testing procedures. In addition to the effect 
that the PP had on the EU’s public view of GMOs, this strategy 
of acceptance played a large role in the creation of biosafety policy 
by the Brazilian government in the late 1990s, which will be 
illustrated in the following analysis of the EU-Brazil relationship 
during the GM controversy.
Iv. wHAT ARE THE OuTcOMES OF BRAzIL-Eu 
INTERAcTIONS DuRINg THIS pERIOD?
After reviewing the evolution of GM agriculture and its social, 
economic, and political implications within both the EU 
and Brazil, the soybean-trade relationship between these two 
countries and how it has transformed since the introduction 
Monsanto’s RR® Soybean in Brazil will now be considered. 
Due to a widespread feeling of dissent in the EU concerning 
the introduction of GM products into their economy, it seems 
natural for their trade relations with Brazil to go sour after their 
GM policy is broadened, allowing multiple new products by 
using their own process of admission and regulatio¬¬n. The EU 
is Brazil’s largest agricultural export market, but even though it is 
assumed that Brazil is losing out because it has become a GM-soya 
producer and the EU is primarily interested in non-GM crops for 
human consumption, I suggest that Brazil has actually benefitted 
as an actor on the international market from the change. Since the 
other major soy producing countries (mainly Argentina and the 
US) have shifted towards primarily growing and exporting GM soy 
rather than non-GM soy, Brazil has taken a hold of the non-GM 
soy market as the only remaining producer. In the EU, therefore, 
they have a monopoly on the non-GM soy product market, which 
greatly improves the economic outlook of non-GM soy farmers in 
Brazil and fortifies their position in the international soy market.
Because of Brazil’s historical background concerning the 
implementation of GM policy, including a distinctive transitional 
period, internal controversy, moratoriums, set-backs, and 
sometimes militant opposition, they saw stunted GM growth 
from the outset. Unlike the other two largest soybean producers 
in the world, Brazil’s GM soya acreage as a percentage of their 
total soya acreage is hovering around 70% and conventional soy 
crops hold the other 30%. Neither Argentina (99% GM) nor the 
United States (90% GM) produce a significant non-GM soya crop 
that could be exported to the EU. Even though the United States 
is the world’s largest international soybean exporter, when solely 
looking at the EU’s soybean imports, we can see that they receive 
a much bigger portion of their soybean products from Brazil, and 
the difference between the quantity of crops imported has grown 
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every year since 2002, when United States’ participation began to 
decline (see Figure 1). Another interesting indicator is the fact that 
even though the quantity of Brazil’s exports have not experienced 
constant, progressive growth, the value of all soy brought into 
the EU has increased by 50% since 2006. Promoting this positive 
trade growth, the EU now allows the importation of hybrid-
GM soybeans that contain a small percentage of Monsanto’s RR® 
product. 
This concession increases the amount of soybean product that 
Brazil exports across the Atlantic and strengthens the EU-Brazil 
trade partnership, which has become especially important in 
the face of recent events that have heightened skepticism over 
importing from countries that mostly produce GM crops. For 
example, in 2009, EC scientists discovered traces of RR maize® 
residue in several bulk shipments of soy being imported into the 
EU from the U.S, causing the EC to reject over 180,000 tons of 
GM soy. This incident could be duplicated in the near future; 
Argentina currently harvests multiple GM varieties that are not 
allowed in the EU and are not even in the assessment process. 
According to the EU’s Zero-Tolerance Policy, “any shipment of 
food or feed must be completely free from even trace amounts of 
GM crops that have not been approved.”  Fortunately, Brazil does 
not currently allow any GM varieties that are not also allowed in 
the EU (at least in some portion). Because of this connection, the 
EU will focus their attention on Brazil’s agricultural sector since a 
GM/non-GM mix-up is much less likely to occur. In that regard, 
Brazil will be poised to take over the EU’s import market, boosting 
Brazil’s soybean price and giving them a monopoly on the entire 
soy sector, both GM and non-GM. 
In addition to the possibility of taking over the U.S’s importation 
of soy to the EU because of legal restrictions and bans, Farm 
Chemicals International published an article in 2006 describing 
the changes in the EU soybean import market, claiming that U.S. 
imports had declined (previously confirmed in Figure 1) and the 
EU was shifting its focus to Brazil. This adjustment, they say, can 
be attributed to the fact that “Brazilian soybeans generally have 
a higher protein and oil content, and because European crushers 
prefer non-GM soybeans.”  Also, the article indicates that the 
Brazilian soybean shipping season lasts longer that in the United 
States, which they claim is generally competitive only between 
October-December.
Generally, the relationship between the EU and Brazil as trading 
partners has been very strong, faltering slightly during the GM 
controversy. After Brazil’s decision to integrate GM soybeans, 
there was an uproar from the EU community as they struggled to 
convince Brazil’s government to retain a precautionary stance on 
biotech foods. The EU sought to continue the importation of non-
GM soybeans (and other vegetable products) as the European anti-
GM faction grew to an overwhelming majority, including both 
retailers and consumers. In 2005, for example, the British Retail 
Consortium (BRC) called on Brazilian farmers to “resist further 
growth of GM planting because it will be enormously difficult to 
maintain trust in the food chain should Brazil’s supply of non-
GM soybeans dry up.”  The BRC implored UK food companies to 
“place firm orders for non-GM soya for animal feed because they 
“feared the availability of non-GM soya products would continue 
to decrease if they did not express their need for them.  In addition 
to this fear of losing non-GM products in the EU, Brazilian food 
manufacturers feared that they would lose their partnerships with 
the European consumer market. 
In 2006, the Brazilian Institute for Consumer Protection 
(IDEC, the same organization that filed a lawsuit against the 
1998 Commercial Release of the GM Soybean) published an 
article titled, “Food Companies Have Adopted Policies Against 
GMOs.” IDEC points out ten different food manufacturers in 
Brazil who have adopted policies against GM food products “as 
a way to meet the European consumer market.”  The article cites 
a 2005 Greenpeace study on consumer acceptance in the EU, 
claiming that 90% of all large retailers and 73% of all food and 
drink manufactures have a GM-free policy. An important aspect 
of the publication is a focus on environmental preservation, 
stating that with conventional soybean planting, a farmer can 
easily respect the environment around his crops. In the end, César 
Borges de Souza, the Vice President of Caramuru Alimentos (a 
grain processor and exporter in Brazil), said that the decision to 
adopt a non-transgenic policy was a “consequence of European 
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politics to trace the origin and processing of the product they 
consume.”  These two perspectives on the status of the non-GM 
soybean market between Brazil-EU are the two central positions 
of the non-transgenic movement, providing insight and analysis 
of each side’s reactions. 
After discussing the implications of the non-GM movement 
among separate economic entities in the market, the value of GM 
soybeans shall be shown in comparison to the average value of GM-
free soybeans that are exported to Europe (see Figure 2). It is clear 
that the EU values non-GM crops much more than GM crops: in 
2008, the value of 1,000 KG of non-GM soya was almost € 800; 
for GM soya it was barely € 400. This data provides a compelling 
argument for the proliferation of non-GM crops in Brazil. But, 
I am not suggesting that GM crops should be replaced – they 
should be supplemented with additional non-GM cropland. 
 Brazil has an enormous amount of arable land that has not been 
cultivated yet, and if non-GM producers utilize these resources 
to expand the non-GM market, the potential economic gains 
are astonishing. It is estimated that there are between 124-247 
million acres of unused land that could be transformed into non-
GM soy farms.  By looking at Table 1 and Figure 3, we can see that 
between 1998 and 2009, the area of soybean crop harvested in 
Brazil climbed from about 30 million acres to almost 55 million 
acres, as production increased by 2/3. At 55 million acres, Brazil 
was producing almost 57 million metric tons of soy as a whole 
(GM and non-GM). Non-GM soy production is estimated to 
have equaled 14.34% of the total soybean production at that time, 
so about 8.17 million metric tons of non-GM soy were harvested 
in 2009.  If the Brazilian agricultural sector develops unused 
arable land and the area of soybean cropland is increased to the 
conservative value of 100 million acres, then there is the potential 
for a harvest of 104 million metric tons of soybeans. If non-GM 
soy rises to just 30% of production, there could be 31+ million 
metric tons of non-GM soy harvested in Brazil. In this event, 
EU retailers and soy-processors would be able to provide many 
more non-GM food items to European consumers, who are still 
desperately seeking non-GM alternatives. The economic benefits 
of this non-GM market expansion would have an extensive impact 
on Brazil’s lucrative soy sector: the country could potentially 
become the world-leader in exporting both GM-soy and non-GM 
soy products.
Through this analysis, I have concluded that non-GM production 
is still an essential part of the Brazilian economy. Brazil would 
face harmful economic repercussions if they, as the world’s 
last large-scale provider of non-GM crops, stopped harvesting 
conventional (non-GM) soybeans. Brazil’s current success as an 
international soybean exporter can be attributed to the influence 
of widespread GM-discontent in the EU on the expansion of the 
Brazilian agricultural sector. Brazil was in a unique position at 
the emergence of the GM movement in the late 1990s because 
they, unlike Argentina and the United States, did not latch on 
to the GM “bandwagon.” Their current GM production level is 
nowhere near the levels of other world leaders in the international 
agricultural market. As Brazilian consumer defense organizations 
and environmentalists rallied against the harvesting of transgenic 
soybeans, the European Union urged Brazil’s anti-GM movement 
to push harder, knowing that if Brazil’s soy crops became 90%+ 
genetically modified, they would have no market for importing 
the non-GM soy products that their consumers were demanding. 
So, with the EU’s support, Brazil has slowly transitioned to an 
international GM-soy producer while maintaining a large sector 
of conventional soy crop. Therefore, Brazil is able to trade soy 
products in two distinct markets, reaping the benefits of both GM 
and non-GM consumer bases, rather than solely profiting from 
GM-soy materials. 
As a result of my analysis of the trading relationship between the 
EU and Brazil, I conclude that without the EU’s support of their 
non-GM soy sector, Brazil would not have been able to reach 
its current level of soy production. Since GM-soy production 
in Brazil was stunted early-on, the soy-export market would 
have been quickly surpassed by other GM-soy providers; the 
proliferation of non-GM soy farming has secured Brazil’s place 
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